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INTRODUCTION
In Greek myth, Procrustes, a bandit son of Poseidon, had a one-size-fitsall iron bed on which he invited passers-by to spend the night.1 Once his
guests were asleep, he used his ironsmith’s hammer to stretch them to fit
the bed. If a guest proved too tall, Procrustes would use shears to amputate
the excess in order that the body would fit the bed. Ultimately, Theseus,
who killed the Minotaur and escaped the Maze using Ariadne’s thread,
killed Procrustes by compelling him to fit his own body to his bed.
In current parlance, a procrustean bed is an arbitrary standard to which
exact conformity is enforced; that which does not fit the standard is either
ignored or stretched and cut until compliant. A procrustean law is
canonical, formal, rigid, hard, and fast, from which there can be no
deviation. Procrustean laws have their place, and where uniformity is
necessary or desired, Procrustes should rear his head.
However,
procrustean laws have costs as well, since individual circumstances, choice,
and liberty are neglected at the expense of uniformity.
A fundamental and long-standing corporate law issue is whether, and the
extent to which, a procrustean bed of unalterable rules should apply to
business corporations, or whether shareholders should be able to select the
bed of their own choosing when joining together in a business relationship
in corporate form.2 For example, one of corporate law’s central mantras
1. See Procrustes, THE ENCYLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/477822/Procrustes.
2. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have noted that the tension between the
shareholder profit maximization norm and shareholder choice have “plagued”
corporate law scholars for many years:
[W]hat is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for whom? Social
welfare more broadly defined? . . . Our response to such questions is: who
cares? If the New York Times is formed to publish a newspaper first and
make a profit second, no one should be allowed to object. Those who came in
at the beginning consented, and those who came later bought stock the price of
which reflected the corporation’s tempered commitment to a profit objective.
If a corporation is started with a promise to pay half the profits to the
employees rather than the equity investors, that too is simply a term of the
contract.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 35–36 (1991). Easterbrook and Fischel respect freedom of contract
and believe shareholders should be free to create corporations that respect their choices
and values. Others express similar contractarian views. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 547, 577–83 (2003) (arguing that the shareholder wealth maximization
norm should be a default rule because parties would choose this rule in a hypothetical
bargain, but leaving room for contracting away from the default rule); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1752 (2006) (observing that flexibility to engage in “private ordering” is a
goal in Delaware corporate law); Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent
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reflects a norm that American business corporations have the purpose of
creating financial benefit for their shareholders.3 In Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., the Michigan Supreme Court stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
benefit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in
the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of
profits among shareholders in order to devote them to other purposes.4

In procrustean terms, this view of corporate essence would mean, first,
that corporations do not have purposes and goals that do not involve
shareholder profit-maximization and, second, that corporate agents,
including directors, who pursue other purposes and goals, can be liable to
the corporation and its shareholders for breach of their fiduciary duty and
for waste of corporate assets. Although modern corporate law may be
more nuanced than that expressed in 1919 by Dodge,5 shareholder profitCommentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 179 (2008) (arguing that
shareholder profit maximization is only a default rule that shareholders can vary by
agreement).
3. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2073 (2001) (stating that norms “emphasize the
value, appropriateness, and indeed the justice of maximizing shareholder wealth”); D.
Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 290 (1997)
(arguing that the effect of the wealth maximization norm is overstated); see also
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 340 (1997) (“[Norms are] informal social regularities that individuals feel
obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of
external non-legal sanctions, or both.”).
4. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). Of course, the
question of what “primarily” means is left dangling. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Why
We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008) (arguing
that Dodge promotes a constipated view of corporate purposes). Some promoters of
benefit corporation legislation argue that Dodge is “good law” and state that “many still
maintain” that Dodge’s wealth maximization principles have been widely accepted by
courts over an extended period of time. See William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K.
Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business
Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825–26 (2012).
5. For example, under the business judgment rule, courts almost always defer to
the directors’ business judgment. If a course of action may lead to some potential
shareholder benefit, board decisions generally survive judicial review. See Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[The business judgment rule] is a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.”). Corporations generally can claim that their socially or
environmentally beneficial activities help them achieve short- or long-term financial
goals. Issues arise on the fringes, where the social activities are so significantly
extreme that they connect to no financial purpose or where there are Revlon duties to
maximize the shareholders’ immediate return when a break-up is inevitable or
shareholders are selling controlling interests. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“A board may have regard for
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maximization principles have been expressed in more recent cases and
writings.6 Thus, corporate directors arguably continue to have a fiduciary
duty requiring that they be motivated by their desire to increase the
corporation’s value for the shareholders’ benefit.
Even if the legal effect of the shareholder profit-maximization norm
might be overstated, the widely-held perception that corporations exist to
maximize shareholder profit can operate on a prophylactic level to
discourage directors from considering non-shareholder interests when
making significant corporate decisions. For example, Ben & Jerry’s was
once a poster child for social enterprise and social entrepreneurship,
pursuing a “dual-mission”7 by seeking to advance its founders’ progressive
social goals while yielding an acceptable financial return to its

various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders. However, such concern for nonstockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in
progress, and the object is no longer to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise, but
to sell it to the highest bidder.”); see also Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985) (a board considering a hostile takeover bid may consider the bid’s
effect on the corporate enterprise, including “constituencies other than shareholders,”
such as creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally);
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 1968) (stating that corporate
directors could consider the effect of lights and night-time baseball games at Wrigley
Field on surrounding property values, and “the long run interest of the corporation in its
property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood
from deteriorating”); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate
Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (2008) (noting theoretical uncertainty on fundamental
questions of corporate governance, including questions concerning for whose benefit
corporations are run and corporate law’s relationship to the achievement of social
good). See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct That Does Not
Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, The Penumbra Effect,
Reciprocity, The Prisoner’s Dilemma, Sheep’s Clothing, Social Conduct, and
Disclosure, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1998); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the
Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533 (2006).
6. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34–35 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (“Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a [corporate
policy] . . . to defend a business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth
maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under
Delaware law. . . . Having chosen a for-profit corporation form, the craigslist directors
are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form [including]
acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”);
Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the obligation of
directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the
corporation’s stockholders . . . .”). See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of
the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Leo E. Strine, Our Continuing Struggle With the Idea That
For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012) [hereinafter
Strine, Our Continuing Struggle]; David A. Wishnick, Comment, Corporate Purposes
in a Free Enterprise System: A Comment on eBay v. Newmark, 121 YALE L.J. 2405
(2012).
7. Robert A. Katz & Anthony Page, Is Social Enterprise the New Social
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1355, 1357 (2011).
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shareholders.8 In 2000, however, Ben & Jerry’s was acquired by Unilever,
an international conglomerate that may, over time, have a different focus
from the Ben & Jerry’s founders. Paradise lost, at least according to one
storyline. Some have argued that corporate law compelled the Ben &
Jerry’s-Unilever transaction by presenting the Ben & Jerry’s board with
two options when Unilever made its takeover bid: accept the offer with its
rich rewards to existing shareholders (including the founders), or attempt to
thwart it by using anti-takeover measures and other protective devices with
the potential for fiduciary breach claims by shareholders who were
deprived of maximum financial benefit.9 In Ben & Jerry’s case, such antitakeover devices had been put in place well before the Unilever bid, but the
board chose not to deploy them due, perhaps, to personal sensitivity to
liability risk.10 Instead, the profit-maximization route was taken and Ben &
Jerry’s became something else.11
The “social enterprise” movement has reacted to this perceived
procrustean bed of corporate profit-maximization in several ways.12 First,
8. For a well-reasoned analysis of the Ben & Jerry’s takeover that takes a more
complex and nuanced approach, see generally Anthony Page & Robert Katz, Freezing
Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L.
REV. 211 (2010) (noting commentary, including from Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield,
to the effect that corporate law required the board to take an offer that well exceeded
the stock trading price despite the fact that they did not want to sell the company;
noting that corporate law did not mandate the sale and therefore concluding that profitmaximization principles were a handy scapegoat; arguing that certain pro-social
attributes of Ben & Jerry’s continued unabated after its acquisition; and concluding that
corporate law is sufficiently flexible to enable a double bottom-line approach and that
social enterprises need to consider structures that make the founders’ initial social
benefit preferences more robust and less malleable over time). The Ben & Jerry’s case
may point out the danger of reliance on special founders, who can espouse negative
social views, change their minds and seek profit, or “cash out” and admit minority
shareholders who limit the founders’ ability to maintain a personal vision after having
taken other peoples’ money. My observation on a recent failed attempt to pass benefit
corporation legislation in the 2012 Colorado legislative session is that it was
significantly motivated by one founder’s attempt to incorporate her social motivations
into her corporation, so that she could then sell shares to third parties and cash out of
some or all her investment.
9. Id. at 228–29.
10. Id. at 234–42.
11. Id. at 242–48 (discussing post-acquisition changes to Ben & Jerry’s).
12. See Robert Katz & Anthony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L.
REV. 59, 86 (2010) [hereinafter Katz & Page, Social Enterprise] (defining “social
enterprise” as an entity having profit-making goals while also embracing the duty to
sometimes make decisions that will not maximize profit and sharing some of the social
aims of a public benefit nonprofit corporation). See generally Thomas Kelley, Law and
Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009).
B Lab Corporation also operates a certification program through which
qualifying entities, including corporations, limited liability companies, cooperatives,
and others, can license a “B Corp” trademark in order to hold themselves out as a “B
corporation” to investors and the public. This certification program and the “B Corp”
mark are sometimes confused with the benefit corporation movement. They are very
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some promoters have pushed the concept of low-profit limited liability
companies (“L3Cs”), and several state legislatures have adopted this
limited liability company deviation. Proponents of L3Cs have argued that
they help solve fiduciary duty problems by establishing that social benefit
goals prevail over, or at least are balanced against, profit-maximization
objectives when managerial authority is exercised.13 Allan Vestal and I,
and others, have been critical of L3Cs, in part because we view existing
limited liability company law as highly malleable and, therefore, L3Cs as
irrelevant to fiduciary and other issues.14 I will not repeat those arguments
in this Article.
Second, others, led by B Lab Corporation (“Blabs”), have encouraged
state legislatures to adopt so-called “benefit corporation” legislation in
order to “redefine the purpose of business organizations.”15 It is argued
that this redefinition is necessitated by existing obstacles to articulating and
enforcing dual public good/private benefit concepts if corporations adopt
traditional nonprofit or for-profit organizational forms.16 Nonprofit
corporations do not allow profit distributions to members and therefore
cannot attract investment capital, while, as discussed above, for-profit
corporations arguably are required to favor private benefit over public
good. The promoters of benefit corporations state that distinctive features
of such benefit corporations are: (1) in addition to for-profit objectives,
they have a corporate purpose to create a material positive impact on
different, as the “B Corp” license involves branding only, and “benefit corporation”
involves changes to state corporation laws. At present, “B Corp” does not need to be a
“benefit corporation,” and a “benefit corporation” does not need to license the “B
Corp” label. I have heard anecdotally that B Lab Corporation has stated it will not
license its “B Corp” mark to Washington social purpose corporations and, if this is
true, one is left wondering about the future of the mark.
13. See, e.g., John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117 (2010);
Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L.
REV. 105, 105 (2010) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise] (discussing the
“two masters” problem).
14. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit
Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation
Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 286–88 (2010). See
generally Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New
Clothes” on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879 (2010)
(criticizing the L3C form).
15. See generally Clark & Babson, supra note 4. As of December 20, 2012, twelve
states have adopted benefit corporation legislation that adheres generally to the Blabs
model discussed below. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR.,
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
In addition to benefit corporation legislation, California also adopted a flexible benefit
corporation statute. Washington has adopted a social purposes corporation statute.
16. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011) [hereinafter Brakman
Reiser, Benefit Corporations].
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society and the environment; (2) their directors’ duties are expanded to
require consideration of public interests in addition to the shareholders’
financial interests; and (3) they are required to report annually on overall
social and environmental performance using an appropriate third-party
standard.17 Assuming that the shareholder profit-maximization principles
create a procrustean bed that cannot be varied by private agreement, the
proponents of benefit corporations can be thought of as attempting by
statute to allow at least some American corporations to choose to arise
from that bed and smell the free-trade coffee of social and environmental
good, thereby pleasing consumers, employees, investors, and society.
In this Article, I make three overarching assumptions, each of which is
highly contestable. First, I assume that American corporate law presently
includes a shareholder profit-maximization principle to which all for-profit
corporations must adhere and which allows insufficient deviation by
shareholder agreement or otherwise. Second, I assume that corporate
fiduciary duty law requires more-or-less uncompromising director and
officer adherence to the profit-maximization principle in connection with
their management of the corporation, both in establishing corporate policy
and in corporate operations. In this regard, I also assume that there are
settings in which the pursuit of public good is outside the parameters of the
business judgment rule.18 Third, I assume that shareholders should be
allowed to choose a different regime in which social and environmental
goals are given their due, and in which corporate directors and officers are
required to consider public goods in addition to private, monetary good
when exercising their discretion in managing corporate affairs. In short, I
assume, without significant reflection or analytical development of the
myriad issues behind these assumptions, that we have arrived at the starting
point to consider entities like benefit corporations. These assumptions
allow a pragmatic focus on how benefit corporations should work, and the
remainder of this Article considers the structure of benefit corporations,
primarily by considering Blabs’ “Model Benefit Corporation Act” (the
“Model”).19 It argues that the current model of benefit corporations as
expressed by Blabs is itself too rigid and uncompromising, indeed that it
fits all benefit corporations onto the Blabs promoters’ own procrustean

17. Clark & Babson, supra note 4, at 818–19.
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19. J. William Callison, Pragmatic Reform: Lessons from the South African

Experiment, 91 KY. L.J. 841, 843 (2002–2003) (“[B]usiness organization law should
not be a matter of orthodox ideology imbedded in an unchanging set of principles, but
instead, like a coral reef, should grow by accretion over time and should be hospitable
to living things.”).
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bed.20 It asserts that the Blabs Model will ultimately discourage
corporations from becoming benefit corporations and will discourage
outside investment in benefit corporations and consumer validation of the
benefit corporation status. It concludes with an examination of alternative
structures, including an alternative to the orthodox benefit corporation
structure, that operate under the same fundamental assumptions as those
that guide the benefit corporation movement, that help resolve the problems
with Blabs’ Model, and that would be more hospitable for American
business corporations that seek to promote values beyond shareholder
profit-maximization. In short, this Article attempts to create a comfortable
bed that fits all, rather than a device that chops arms and legs to fit the bed
to passers-by who seek respite.21
I.

OVERVIEW OF BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION

The states that have enacted benefit corporation legislation have
modestly different variations on the theme.22 Rather than examine any
particular state benefit corporation statute, this Article considers Blabs’
Model, which at present is the foundation for all existing benefit
corporation statutes.23 Under the Model:
1. A “benefit corporation” is a business corporation, formed pursuant
to the state’s general business corporation law, which has elected to subject
20. My views and comments concerning benefit corporations have been influenced
by an approximately two-and-a-half year discussion of the benefit corporation
structure, which has played out twice in the Colorado legislature. At least to me, it has
become apparent that the proponents of the Blabs structure seek orthodoxy to the
model statute such that those who adhere to a rigid law can proclaim themselves as
benefit corporations and capture whatever economic benefit can be derived therefrom.
Others, principally lawyers who have labored over Colorado business entity statutes for
many decades, seek a more open-ended approach whereby all corporations that seek to
include socially and/or environmentally beneficial purposes, as defined by the
shareholders, can obtain benefit corporation status without undue cost. Thus, the two
positions share the end of allowing deviation from the wealth-maximization norm, but
differ on the question of whether the statutory benefit should be exclusively held by a
few or available to many. I also note that the supporters of benefit corporation
legislation appear to be, like me, from the progressive political left. This leads me to
wonder whether the same support would be there for a statute that could or would be
used by others who do not share the same outlooks. In my view, benefit corporation
legislation should be drafted so that it is conducive to all who seek social good,
however they define it.
21. See generally Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise, supra note 13 (encouraging
experimentation with hybrid forms); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform
Laws, Model Laws and Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 947 (1995)
(stating the authors’ early argument that excessive, externally-imposed, uniformity can
be inefficient and is costly since it halts statutory evolution).
22. See Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 16 (discussing some of
the variations).
23. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. (B Lab 2012), available at
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/Model_Legislation.pdf.
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The
itself to the benefit corporation provisions of the Model.24
corporation’s articles of incorporation must state that it is a “benefit
corporation,” thereby placing potential investors, creditors, and others who
inspect organizational documents on notice of the corporation’s status.25
There are no name requirements, either in the positive sense, where benefit
corporations must designate themselves as such, or in the negative sense,
where corporations that are not benefit corporations cannot use a name
implying benefit corporation status.
2. If an existing corporation seeks to become a benefit corporation, or
if an existing corporation seeks to merge into a benefit corporation,
shareholders owning at least two-thirds of the interests must approve the
election.26 Similarly, a two-thirds shareholder vote is needed to terminate
benefit corporation status.27 Notably, the Model does not presently contain
dissenters’ rights or other provisions to protect the interests of noncontrolling shareholders who invested in what they believed to be a profitmaximizing business.28
24. Id. § 101(c) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . [the business corporation law]
shall be generally applicable to all benefit corporations.”); id. § 103 (noting a
requirement for formation of benefit corporation); id. § 104 (requiring an election of
benefit corporation status).
25. Id. § 103.
26. Id. § 104 (requiring “minimum status vote” to change the status of a
corporation); id. § 102 (defining same as a two-thirds vote). Here, I note that Section
101(d) states that the articles of incorporation or bylaws may not relax, be inconsistent
with, or supersede, any other benefit corporation provisions. Thus, if the legislature
adopts a two-thirds vote requirement, unlike other shareholder vote items, the election
cannot be reduced to, for example, majority vote or increased to, for example,
unanimous vote. In addition, a “minimum status vote” requires the vote of two-thirds
of the shareholders of every class or series, irrespective of their other voting powers.
27. Id. § 105(a). Further, Section 105(b) requires that “sales, leases . . . or other
dispositions of all or substantially all” of the benefit corporation’s assets that are not in
the ordinary course of business “shall not be effective” unless approved by at least a
two-thirds vote. This two-thirds vote requirement cannot be reduced by the
corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws. Id. § 101(d). In some situations, this
requirement may create business-planning difficulties and these difficulties may be
exacerbated by the fact that a two-thirds vote is required from the shareholders of each
class or series of shares, irrespective of their participation in control of other corporate
actions.
28. The benefit corporation proponents’ position on the dissenters’ rights issue is
unclear. Although the California benefit corporation statute and the Blabs-sponsored
Colorado bill included dissenters’ rights provisions, Blabs generally has not promoted
dissenters’ rights because electing corporations may not have liquid capital to pay
dissenters and because any payment would deprive the corporation of operating capital
for its business and social good. See William H. Clark et al., The Need and Rationale
for the Benefit Corporation: Why it is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of
Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and Ultimately, the Public, 1, 26–27 (Jan. 26, 2012)
(white paper), available at http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/The_Need_and_
Rationale_for_Benefit_Corporations_April_2012.pdf. Notwithstanding these liquidity
issues, state legislatures should include, and some have included, dissenter’s rights
provisions in their benefit corporation legislation. Alternatively, the election of benefit
corporation status should require unanimous shareholder consent. However, this may
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3. A benefit corporation must have the purpose of “creating [a] general
public benefit.”29 In addition to, but not instead of, a general public
benefit, the articles of incorporation may identify specific public benefits
“that it is the purpose of the benefit corporation to create.”30 “Identification
of a specific public benefit . . . does not limit the obligation of a benefit
corporation [to create a general public benefit].”31 Thus, general public
purpose is superior, and specificity is a subcategory of the general and is
thereby rendered somewhat superfluous.
4. “General public benefit,” to be pursued by all benefit corporations,
is defined very broadly as “a material positive impact on society and the
environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard,
from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”32 There is no
clarification about the hierarchy of benefit purposes served by the
corporation. The Model’s comments state, “[b]y requiring that the impact
of a business on society and the environment be looked at ‘as a whole,’ the
concept of general public benefit requires consideration of all the effects of
the business on society and the environment.”
A “third-party standard” is a “recognized standard for defining, reporting
and assessing corporate social and environmental performance.”33 A thirdparty standard is also credible, transparent, and developed by an
independent organization.34 The Model spills much ink attempting to
define each of these characteristics, but it does not prescribe any content for
the standards, and it fails to state how standards are applied or by whom.
Neither the government nor the standard-setter is given any enforcement
powers. Thus, it is conceivable that some third-party standard-setters will
establish very low, but transparent, standards for benefit corporations and
the whole concept of public good will go down the greenwash drain. There
is also no indication in the Model concerning fees that can be charged by
make adoption of benefit corporation status impossible in many situations, and
adoption of dissenters’ rights provisions seems more palatable. At a minimum, the lack
of dissenters’ rights demonstrates that the Model is either badly drafted or unduly
authoritarian in nature.
29. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 201(a). The use of the word “creating” seems
odd and may exclude non-creative aspects such as “sustaining.”
30. Id. § 201(b).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 102.
33. Id. Note that the Model does not refer only to business operations, but requires
the consideration of existential questions like the nature of the corporation’s business
itself. Some corporations will likely shy away from benefit corporation status due to an
ongoing need to consider whether, for example, making salad dressing or running a ski
resort or brewing beer or manufacturing high-fat ice cream has a material positive
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole.
34. Id.
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standard-setters for making their presumably useful and possibly valuable
standards available.
5. The creation of general public benefit and any specific public
benefit “is in the best interests of the benefit corporation.”35
[Directors] shall (i.e., must), in discharging their duties and in
considering the corporation’s best interests, consider the effects of any
action or inaction on (i) shareholders; (ii) the employees and workforce
of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries and its suppliers; (iii) the
interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit;
(iv) community and societal factors (including those of all communities
in which the corporation, its subsidiaries and its suppliers have offices or
facilities); (v) the local and global environment; (vi) the corporation’s
short-term and long-term interests, including benefits that may accrue
from long-term plans and the possibility that those interests may be best
36
served by the corporation’s continued independence; and (vii) the
corporation’s ability to accomplish its general public benefit purpose and
any specific public benefit purpose . . . .37

There is no hierarchy to or prioritization of the interests that directors
must consider.38 In addition, under the Model, directors may consider
“other pertinent factors or the interests of any other group that they deem
appropriate.”39 Further, the Model provides that directors are not
personally liable for monetary damages for any action taken as a director or
the failure of the benefit corporation to create public benefit,40 and that
directors are not liable to beneficiaries of the corporation’s general public
benefit purpose or specific public benefit purpose arising from the person’s

35. Id. § 201(c).
36. The breadth of this factor likely allows many forms of anti-takeover provisions

based on the directors’ perception of the corporation’s long-term interests. It thereby
may gut the shareholder protections contained in much recent corporate case law.
37. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a)(1) (emphasis and commentary added).
38. Id. § 301(a)(3) (“[Directors] need not give priority to the interests of a
particular person or group . . . over the interests of any other person or group, unless the
benefit corporation has stated in its articles its intention to give priority to certain
interests related to its accomplishment of its general public benefit purpose or of [any]
specific public benefit purpose.”). It appears that a benefit corporation cannot indicate
a priority for shareholder interests.
39. Id. § 301(a)(2).
40. Id. § 301(c). Bill Clark and Elizabeth Babson state that the elimination of
director monetary liability was “driven by twin desires to (1) eliminate such concern in
the face of a lack of court precedent by which such liability could be quantified and (2)
to focus courts on the exclusive remedy of awarding injunctive relief wherein the
benefit corporation would be required to simply live up to the commitments it
voluntarily undertook.” Clark & Babson, supra note 4, at 848–49. Enforcement
problems are discussed later in this Article.
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status as a beneficiary.41
The standards of conduct set forth for directors establish, and are
intended to establish, director fiduciary duties. They affect the essential
nature of a benefit corporation in two ways. First, directors who consider
the enumerated factors are insulated from shareholder claims that they
breached their fiduciary duties by not acting to maximize shareholder
benefit. Second, they establish positive rules for director action. The first
aspect is contained in the Model’s provision that the consideration of the
enumerated interests and factors does not constitute a violation of fiduciary
standards42 and that directors are not monetarily liable for damages. The
second aspect is emphasized through the Model’s creation of “benefit
enforcement proceedings” against directors and officers who do not march
to the benefit corporation tune.43
6. “Benefit enforcement proceedings” may be brought directly by the
benefit corporation or derivatively by (a) a shareholder or shareholders that
own at least 2% of the shares on the date the proceeding commences, (b) a
director, (c) a person or group owning 5% or more of equity interests in a
benefit corporation’s parent corporation (subsidiaries/parent corporations
are defined using a 50% ownership standard), or (d) other persons specified
in the corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws.44 Unless otherwise
provided in articles or bylaws, benefit corporation directors do not have
duties to mere beneficiaries of the public purpose who are not listed
above.45 Thus, for example, customers, employees of suppliers, and
representatives of impacted communities or the environment cannot sue.46
A “benefit enforcement proceeding” is a claim or action for failure of a
benefit corporation to pursue or create general public benefit (or a specific
public benefit set forth in its articles), or for violation of any statutory
obligation, duty, or standard.47 Thus, it is the clear intent of the Model to
41. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(d).
42. Id. § 301(b)(1) (consideration of general and specific public benefit interests

does not constitute a violation of corporation laws concerning director fiduciary duties).
43. Id. § 305(a)(1).
44. Id. § 305(b).
45. Id. § 301(d).
46. This clearly tilts the playing field in favor of the set of interests represented by
those who own (by issuance or acquisition) corporate stock and away from those
representing other interests. See discussion of enforcement issues, infra.
47. Id. § 305(b). The proceeding is direct when brought by the corporation and
derivative when brought by directors or shareholders. Presumably all procedural
aspects of derivative litigation, including a demand for corporate action and the
potential for a special litigation committee to consider whether pursuing the litigation is
in the corporation’s best interests, will be applicable. In my view, the derivative
litigation issues will likely be complex, and thereby weaken the benefit corporation
concept.
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enable fiduciary duty litigation not only against directors who fail to meet
their obligation to consider the effects of their action in the statutorily-listed
ways, but also against directors whose actions fail to create general public
benefit. Other than in a benefit enforcement proceeding, no person can
assert a claim against the benefit corporation and its directors for failure to
pursue or create benefit or for a violation of a standard of conduct under the
Model.48
7. The board of directors of a benefit corporation that is publicly traded
must include an independent “benefit director,” and the board of other
corporations may include a benefit director.49 The benefit director must
prepare an annual opinion concerning (a) whether the benefit corporation
acted, in all material respects, in accordance with its general public benefit
purpose and any specific public benefit purpose; (b) whether directors and
officers complied with their obligations to consider the best interests listed
in the Model; and (c) a description of any ways in which the corporation or
its directors or officers failed to comply.50
8. Benefit corporations must prepare an “annual benefit report”
meeting numerous requirements, including a narrative description of the
ways the benefit corporation pursued general public benefit during the year
and the extent to which it was created, circumstances hindering the creation
of public benefit, and the process and rationale for choosing or changing
the third-party standard used.51 The narrative must also include an
assessment of the corporation’s overall social and environmental
performance against a third-party standard, the name and address of any
benefit director, the compensation paid to each director, the name of each
five percent shareholder (including known beneficial shareholders), any
benefit director’s opinion, and a statement of certain relationships with the
third-party standard provider.52 The Model does not state how the benefit
report should assess corporate performance, and one might expect some
benefit corporations to provide very general, even minimalist, reports. The
report (along with any benefit director opinion) must be provided to each
shareholder, posted on the “public portion” of its Internet website (or made
available to any person requesting it), and filed with the state’s secretary of
state or other filing official.53
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. § 305(a).
Id. § 302(a). “Independent” is defined in Section 102.
Id. § 302(c).
Id. § 401(a)(1).
Id. § 401(a)(2)–(7).
Id. § 401(c)–(e). Director compensation and proprietary information can be
eliminated from public reports. One wonders whether almost all information will be
proprietary information. In Colorado, the Secretary of State balked at the public filing
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9. Various similar rules apply to officers.
It should be clear from the foregoing that benefit corporation status
involves a large and complex superstructure that cannot be diminished by
agreement among the shareholders or otherwise. Assuming that there are
benefits to benefit corporation status, they come with large structural and
other costs.
II. PROBLEMS AND DANGERS OF BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUS
In this Section, I identify and discuss several large issues with the
current, orthodox benefit corporation Model. I refer to these as the
“Illiberalism Problem,” the “Bipolarity Problem,” the “Fiduciary
Uncabining Problem,” and the “Greenwash/Greenmail Enforcement
Problem.” It should be noted that these criticisms focus solely on the
orthodox Blabs Model legislation and therefore on state benefit corporation
statutes derived from the Blabs Model. As noted throughout this Article, I
generally support the concept of allowing corporate shareholders to elect
deviation from the profit-maximization norm, and I generally support a
modified, flexible, elegant, and convergent benefit corporation statute to
enable corporations to do so.54 In essence, the remainder of this Article
represents one perspective on an intellectual debate about how benefit
corporation legislation should work, not whether benefit corporations
should exist in some form.
A. The Illiberalism Problem of General Public Benefit
Benefit corporations, as exemplified by the Model, deprive benefit
corporations of choice, and instead attempt to fit all electing corporations to
broad, state-authorized conceptions of the “good” as measured against a
third-party standard.
Thus, benefit corporations are illiberal and
conformity-inducing.
Although there are many variations of liberal political theory,
liberalism’s common theme is the paramount value of autonomy and
freedom. Liberal theorists agree that a central goal of political society is to
establish conditions for individuals, each of whom has a free and
independent will that should not be dominated by others, to flourish.
Therefore, liberalism historically has focused on rights and choice.55
requirement, and it was eliminated from the proposed legislation.
54. See infra Section III.B of this Article.
55. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. 21 (G.A.J. Rogers & Karl
Schuhmann ed., Thoemmes Continuum 2003) (”Liberty, or [f]reedom [is] . . . the
absence of opposition (by [o]pposition I mean external [i]mpediments of motion).”).
Hobbes recognized both the existence of individual autonomy and the fact that equally
autonomous individuals are vulnerable to interference by other persons’ pursuit of their
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The concepts of “positive” and “negative” liberty form the mainstay of
contemporary liberal political theory. Although the distinction is ancient56
and recurring,57 it received more modern treatment by Isaiah Berlin.58
Berlin stated that positive liberty “derives from the wish on the part of the
individual to be his own master,” to exercise one’s capacities to achieve
one’s own ends.59 Negative liberty, on the other hand, is measured by “the
area within which the subject—a person or group of persons—is or should
be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other
persons.”60
In liberalism’s positive aspect, people exercise their free wills to advance
their individual goals. Positive liberty is the freedom to be, and to do,
anything the actor might wish to be or do.61 In a liberal state, law’s role is
to facilitate individual choices and to ensure that each person, and group of
persons, has as much freedom as possible to pursue goals of his or her own
choosing, rather than to dictate how people should exercise choice or
whether they succeed or fail upon exercising choice. Liberalism can thus
be viewed to include the avoidance of unnecessary procrustean laws.
This positive liberty is limited by others’ freedom to pursue their own
goals, and liberal theory recognizes a need to protect individual boundaries
so that each person’s enjoyment of freedom does not unduly restrict others’
abilities to exercise their freedom. In this sense, liberalism has a “negative
aspect” in that it involves restrictions protecting people from external
own ends. His solution to the “war of all against all” was based on individual
autonomy and contract; people choose to surrender some of their autonomy to the state
in order to maintain their ability to establish and pursue individual goals while
restricting others from interfering with those pursuits.
56. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, reprinted in BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1127,
1265–66 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
57. See BENJAMIN CONSTANT, THE LIBERTY OF THE ANCIENTS COMPARED WITH
THAT OF THE MODERNS (1819), reprinted in LEADING AND LEADERSHIP 110 (Timothy
Fuller ed., 2000).
58. See ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
59. Id. at 131 (“The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on
the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend
on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my
own, not of other men’s, acts of will.”).
60. Id. at 121–22 (“Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a
man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I
could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other
men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be,
enslaved.”).
61. Berlin also notes risks of positive liberty; including that “the real self may be
conceived of as something wider than the individual, as a social ‘whole’ of which the
individual is an element or aspect . . . . [An] entity [that] is then identified as being the
‘true’ self which, by imposing its collective, or ‘organic’ single will upon its
recalcitrant ‘members,’ achieves its own, and therefore their, ‘higher’ freedom.” Id.
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coercion or restraint.62 The negative aspect considers freedom to include
the absence of, or limitations on, governmental regulation. There are
several strands to negative liberal theories based on where the theory is
located on a continuum defining the frontier between private life and public
authority, and thus the permissible scope of governmental power. First, at
one extreme, there are those who believe that government’s sole role is to
protect personal and property rights.63 Second, there are those who argue
that government should not only protect personal and property rights, but
that it should also remedy collective action problems left unresolved by the
free market, but no more.64 Third, there are those who argue that
government should be restrained from limiting individual actions that do
not harm others, but that governmental action is appropriate when
individual actions cause harm to others.65 Finally, there are those who
allow a broader conception of the state’s police power, including the power
to enact legislation relating to the general public welfare.66
Some have referred to liberalism’s “voluntarist conception of freedom”
as having a core thesis and three corresponding elements.67 The core thesis
is that “society, being composed of a plurality of persons having their own
aims, interests and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is
governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular
conception of the good.”68 The corresponding elements are: first, state
power to coerce individuals should be limited to those situations where
collective action to implement collective norms can be justified, otherwise
individuals should be free to pursue their private objectives; second, the
scope of the market and other contract-based institutions should be
correspondingly maximized; and, third, the state should maintain neutrality
as among different conceptions of the good out of respect to individuals’
62. See id. at 122.
63. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 26 (1974) [hereinafter

NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA] (“[T]he appropriate role of the state is limited
to the functions of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the
enforcement of contracts.”). Nozick later characterized this position as “seriously
inadequate.” ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286–87 (1989).
64. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367–86 (4th ed. 1992); see
also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 25 (1962).
65. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1859) (“The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”).
66. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 (Rev. ed. 1999).
67. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1
(2d. ed. 1998).
68. Id. (emphasis omitted).

2012

PUTTING NEW SHEETS ON A PROCRUSTEAN BED

101

freedom and autonomy to choose their own ends.69
The “communitarian” critique of liberalism begins with this notion of
voluntarism, and focuses on the philosophical difficulty inherent in the
liberal conception of persons as “freely choosing, independent selves,
unencumbered by moral or civic ties” existing prior to their choice.70 In the
communitarian view, “the liberal vision cannot account for a wide range of
commonly recognized moral and political obligations,” and liberalism’s
failure rests with its inability to recognize that we can “be claimed by ends
we have not chosen,” such as those given by our identities as members of
families, cultures, traditions, and society. Communitarian theorists note
that when the political world brackets morality too completely, it generates
disenchantment.71 The resulting yearning for a public life of larger
meaning ultimately finds expression in some form, much of it negative and
undesirable.72 Similarly, communitarian analysis notes that the triumph of
the voluntarist conception of freedom has coincided with a growing sense
of disempowerment, in which the freely choosing, independent self
confronts a “world governed by impersonal power structures that defy
individual understanding and control.”73
Benefit corporations can be seen as a communitarian reaction to what
some perceive to be an illiberal corporation law structure that is perceived
to create little or no meaning beyond financial enhancement of individual
shareholders, who then participate, if at all, in social life as individuals.
Thus, the benefit corporation movement can be viewed as having both
liberal and communitarian aspects. The liberal aspect emphasizes choice—
corporate shareholders should be allowed to exercise their own free will to
choose ends to be sought by the corporation. The communitarian aspect
considers corporations, which harbor enormous power and in which much
of the nation’s economic life takes place, to remain insufficiently
encumbered by non-wealth maximizing societal, moral, and environmental
obligations.74 By electing benefit corporation status, shareholders allow
their corporations to become responsible to a “general public purpose,” an
idea mildly redolent of “general will” concepts in Rousseau’s social
contract.75 In a sense, since benefit corporation legislation implies an
69. See NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA, supra note 63, at 30–33.
70. MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A

PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 322 (1996).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 323.
74. This all begs questions concerning the nature of corporations, beginning with
aggregate-entity questions. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). This Article does not discuss this critical question.
75. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, OR PRINCIPLES OF
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aggregate conception of corporations in which shareholders select the
nature of the entity, the shareholders also become personally responsible to
a general purpose.76
Whether or not one accepts the notion that a corporation is a “person,”
some corporations are personal and associational in nature; that is, they are
formed and owned by a single individual or by people who have decided to
act in concert to undertake a trade or business.77 It is likely that most
“associational corporations” are closely-held, and it is likely that
corporations that embrace conceptions of public benefit beyond
shareholder profit-maximization will come largely from this group of
“associational corporations.” It seems relatively unlikely that larger
corporations, in which shareholders do not share familial or personal
connection, will comprise a large proportion of the corporations seeking to
enable values other than shareholder profit-maximization. This is due in
part to an inability to have widely dispersed and heterogeneous
shareholders reach agreements on the pursuit of public good and in part to
various other costs of benefit corporation status. However, allowing
limited, special public values to be adopted might also permit shareholders
POLITICAL RIGHT (G. D. H. Cole, trans. 1782) (1762), available at
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm. Rousseau argued that each individual may
have a particular will which is different from the people’s general will. The
individual’s particular will, moreover, may be forced to submit to the general will
because of the obligations that have been defined for all individuals by the terms of the
social contract. The general will is not some combination of individual wills, but is
concerned with the public interest rather than private interests. Rousseau also argued
that the general will may not always be able to choose correctly between what is
advantageous or disadvantageous for the public interest because it may be influenced
by groups of individuals who are concerned with promoting their private interests.
Thus, the general will may need to be guided by the judgment of a person who is
concerned only with the public interest. This “legislateur” (law-giver) is a person
whose enlightened judgment can determine the justice principles and common good
requirements that are best suited to society.
At a superficial level, benefit corporation legislation seems Rousseauvian.
However, a significant distinction that prevents implication of Rousseau’s social
contract theory in the benefit corporation arena is that Rousseau’s concept of the
general will applies to all persons in society, and not just to those who exercise their
particular will and elect in.
76. The social enterprise movement also allows for a feeling of community with
like-feeling believers and provides a sense not only of doing the right thing, but also
moving in the direction of history. This explains the feeling of sadness and betrayal
expressed by L3C supporters when the Colorado legislature voted against L3C
legislation and the “true believer” approach of some benefit corporation supporters.
The individual is placed at the center of not only a historical project, but a collective
process. See Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1314–18
(2011) (discussing identity theory of nonprofit organizations and noting linkage to
social enterprise); see also TONY JUDT, THINKING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 97–98
(2012) (describing the story of the Soviet Union for those who had faith in it).
77. For example, partnerships are defined as associations of one or more persons to
carry on as co-owners of a business for profit. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997).
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in more widely held corporations to agree to sacrifice some profit for some
public benefit.
Focusing on closely-held corporations, as noted above, the existing
benefit corporation conception is insufficiently liberal. It starts down the
right path by facilitating choice and allowing people who associate together
in business corporation form to agree to pursue a good other than profitmaximization. In this sense, benefit corporations are creatures of positive
liberty and allow an escape from one procrustean bed. However, the cost
of such escape is being strapped into yet another procrustean bed. Rather
than allowing shareholders the autonomy and freedom to pursue their own,
self-defined ends and their own conception of the good, the Model forces
all electing corporations to adhere to broad communitarian conceptions of
“good” assessed against an independent organization’s third-party standard
which has been legislatively endorsed.78 Thus, the positive liberty of the
election is stunted, and the negative liberty of avoiding external constraints
is not obtained. In my opinion, there are insufficient reasons for applying
external constraints, particularly since the state is not providing any
particular benefit to corporations that elect benefit corporation status.79 If
shareholders desire that the corporation they own benefit a particular lowincome community or a particular river watershed, they may do so only by
also adhering to a broader general public benefit purpose of having a
“material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole.”80 Not only must low-income jobs be created or a sustainable
watershed maintained, but beneficial employee health benefits, effects of
corporate actions and inactions on the communities in which suppliers
reside, and effects of actions and inactions on global warming (or perhaps
even the benefits of global warming if all views are taken into account)
must be considered. A “general public purpose” and third-party standards
78. In addition, the violation of negative liberty conceptions is increased by forum
electing benefit corporations who incur the cost of benefit directors, annual benefit
reports, and other constraints that have little to do with the public benefit choice.
79. Berlin notes that drawing the line between private life and public authority is a
“matter of argument, indeed of haggling.” BERLIN, supra note 58, at 124. My
argument is that when government does not provide benefit to the business entity, such
as limited liability, but only facilitates owner choice, government should not impose
limitations on choice or costs for choice. See J. William Callison, Federalism,
Regulatory Competition, and the Limited Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and
the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. CORP. L. 951, 980–81 (2001) (noting that legislative
extension of limited liability protection could have come with related costs); Allan W.
Vestal & Thomas E. Rutledge, Disappointing Diogenes: The LLC Debate That Never
Was, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53 (2006) (discussing legislative adoption of limited liability
protection without discussion of costs and trade-offs). Benefit corporation status
changes the private character of the electing corporation and affects the directors’
actions with respect to the corporation, and there is no role for government to limit the
shareholders’ ability to choose or to impose costs on the choice.
80. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102.
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become the uncontrolled, impersonal moral force that is balanced against
the uncontrolled, impersonal power structure of the contemporary
corporation.81
Further, by mandating assessment of public good against a recognized
third-party standard, certain points of view may be excluded. For example,
if the shareholders wish for their corporation to act in a manner consistent
with tenets of Trotskyism, certain Austrian economists, Herbert Spencer’s
“Social Statistics,” or any number of belief structures, whether on the left
or on the right, it may be difficult for them to find an enabling “third-party
standard” promulgated by some credible independent organization under
whose umbrella public good is to be measured. One man’s global warming
is another’s agricultural crop enhancement—who is to say where “public
benefit” definitively lies? Since liberalism is inherently nonpartisan, and
equally maintains that everyone benefits from everyone’s freedom and that
society has no way to evaluate opinions other than by letting everyone
freely express them and try them out, any third-party imposed limitations
on “public good” are undesirable.82
B. The Bipolarity Problem and Negative Inferences
The illiberalism problem that prevents shareholders from choosing their
own corporate ends is compounded by the legislative inference that
81. A prominent supporter of benefit corporations makes this attribute clear:

One of the main purposes of benefit corporation legislation is to create a
voluntary new corporate form that has the corporate purpose to create benefits
for society and the environment generally, as well as for the shareholders. The
entrepreneurs, investors, consumers, and policymakers interested in new
corporate form legislation are not interested in, for example, reducing waste
while increasing carbon emissions, or reducing both while remaining
indifferent to the creation of economic opportunity for low-income individuals
or underserved communities. They are interested in creating a new corporate
form that gives entrepreneurs and investors the flexibility and protection to
pursue all of these or other public benefit purposes. The best way to give them
what they need is to create a corporate form with a general public benefit
purpose. A company may also designate a specific public benefit, in addition
to its general public benefit purpose. This ensures that a benefit corporation
can pursue any specific mission, but that the company as a whole is also
working toward general public benefit.
Clark & Babson, supra note 4, at 841. One might note the use of “they”—benefit
corporations are not designed for use by corporations that might actually find the form
useful to their business, but rather for some “they” who happens to be interested in a
particular corporate ethos.
82. See FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 30 (1960) (“[A]ll
institutions of freedom are adaptations to this fundamental fact of ignorance, adapted to
deal with chances and probabilities, not certainty. Certainty we cannot achieve in
human affairs . . . .”).
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corporations that are not benefit corporations can act only in ways that
maximize shareholder profit.83 This bipolarity problem has two aspects—
the broad and the narrow. Viewed from a broad corporate governance
perspective, the benefit corporation’s primary rationale is based on the
premise that existing law prevents corporate directors from considering the
social and environmental impact of corporate decisions.84 One might argue
that this view perpetuates the misconception that current corporate law
requires directors to focus solely on immediate profit and share price
maximization, and thereby undermines the promotion of socially
responsible decision-making by corporate boards. However, even under
the restraints of current corporate law, for most corporate decisions there
are no legal restrictions on the directors’ ability to take non-shareholder
interests into account, and there is little or no case law where directors have
been held liable for considering such interests. Therefore, the benefit
corporation movement arguably harms the broader interests of 21st century
corporate governance by creating a bipolar world of regular corporations
that maximize private profits and other corporations that consider social
and environmental sustainability and other public goods.85 Benefit
corporation legislation, particularly in the Model form proposed by Blabs,
overstates the limitations of existing law on corporate decision-making and
might have unintended consequences in future judicial decisions that
consider the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties. This problem could be
exacerbated by intemperate language, such as that contained in the New
York State Senate memorandum introducing benefit corporations: “[The
bill] removes legal impediments preventing businesses and investors from
making their own decisions to use sustainability and social innovation as a
competitive advantage.”86 Loose lips sink ships, and one might be excused
for thinking that the business judgment rule eliminates this issue, at least
when “competitive advantage” is involved.
83. Although the MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 101(b) provides that “[t]he
existence of a provision of this [statute] shall not of itself create an implication that a
contrary or different rule of law is applicable to a business corporation that is not a
benefit corporation,” this does not change the existential question of whether a
legislature’s adoption of a benefit corporation statute entails recognition of the profit
maximization norm as a starting place for all corporations.
84. See Clark and Babson, supra note 4, at 825–38.
85. Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A
Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May
13, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/13/benefitcorporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy/.
86. S.
MEMORANDUM,
S79A-2011
(N.Y.
2011),
available
at
http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S79A-2011; Promote Corporate Responsibility
Through Benefit Corporation Statutes, AM. SUSTAINABLE BUS. COUNCIL,
http://asbcouncil.org/campaigns/promote-corporate-responsibility-through-benefitcorporation-statutes (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
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Notwithstanding the broad argument, which indicates a need to limit
some of the rhetoric of the benefit corporation movement, benefit
corporation status does allow directors to consider public goods that are
completely unrelated to corporate business purposes and are essentially
personal to the corporation’s shareholders, thereby moving them beyond
the business judgment rule’s protections. In my view, this is where benefit
corporations may add value. However, under the orthodox Blabs Model,
this is available only for corporations that elect to pursue “general public
benefit,” and not corporations that, while pursuing public benefit, want a
more limited scope of public benefit. To the extent that benefit corporation
legislation implies that directors cannot implement shareholders’ narrower
public benefit goals, or that they have liability if they do so, the orthodox
Model is harmful.
For example, assume that all shareholders of “Peachblossom Orchard,” a
close corporation that manufactures and sells clothing items from Delta,
Colorado, recognize the connection of their corporation and themselves to
the Delta community, and they desire that their corporation shall invest in
and otherwise diminish private profit by providing benefit to the
community. Assume that the shareholders do not wish to subscribe to more
general standards of “material positive impact” on society and
environment, do not wish to assess their corporation against a third-party
standard, see no need in their closely-held corporation for benefit directors,
do not want the risk of benefit enforcement proceedings, and do not want
the expense and privacy loss of annual benefit reporting—they only seek to
invest in their community. Thus, Peachblossom Orchard should not
become a “benefit corporation,” at least as defined in the orthodox Model.
Assume that the directors substantially reduce potential profit from their
very successful clothing business by creating benefit to the Delta
community, just as the shareholders want. A shareholder dies and her son
inherits the stock. The son notes the “waste” of corporate assets on nonpecuniary, community-enhancing activities, demands that the waste stop,
and sues the directors for breach of their fiduciary duty to act in the
corporation’s best interests. The directors refer to the shareholders’ wishes
for Delta, Colorado.
A likely response would be that the legislature enacted benefit
corporation legislation as a response to the shareholder wealthmaximization principle, that providing mandatory general and precatory
specific public benefit is in the “best interests” only of electing benefit
corporations, and that directors of benefit corporations alone may consider
the effects of their actions on public good. However, it is likely that
Peachblossom Orchard would not be considered a benefit corporation, and
therefore its directors cannot consider public good in making their

2012

PUTTING NEW SHEETS ON A PROCRUSTEAN BED

107

decisions, rendering corporate expenditures on the community excessive
and beyond those that can be made under the penumbra of the business
judgment rule. Thus, potential liability (and certainly risk and settlement
fodder) for corporate waste and a breach of fiduciary duty follows, as well
as a likely forward-looking director’s focus on profit and not on Delta. If
one accepts the premise that shareholders should be allowed to choose
corporate ends beyond profit maximization, this is an unfortunate result.
Benefit corporations should be enabling, not disabling. They should not be
used to draw lines between corporations that pursue good whose directors
are protected and corporations who pursue good whose directors are
unprotected. Further, they should not be used in a way that implies director
liability for public good-seeking corporations that do not wish to toe an
undesirable and expensive orthodox Blabs line.
C. The Fiduciary Uncabining Problem and the Loss of Fiduciary
Restraints
Two leading approaches to fiduciary duty have emerged—contractarian
and fiduciarian—and benefit corporations satisfy neither.87 In each case,
there is recognition that the internal structures of business entities create
relationships of power and dependency, and that the law has attempted to
provide a principled set of rules to ensure that those with power are
accountable to those that depend on its appropriate exercise. The question
becomes the foundation of (and limitations on) the power and dependency
relationship.
Contractarians argue that fiduciary duties should be confined to
relationships involving the contractual delegation of broad and open-ended
power over one’s property.88 Thus, the existence of fiduciary duties
(specifically, duties of care and loyalty) depends on the structure of the
parties’ relationship, as expressed by their actual or implied contract.
Contractarians further argue that fiduciary duties are a response to the
impossibility of writing contracts that completely specify the parties’
Thus, contractarians conclude that the “fiduciary”
obligations.89
relationship is a contract gap-filler, characterized by high costs of
specification and monitoring, in which the courts prescribe the actions that
the parties, presumed to be rational and benefit-maximizing persons, would

87. See J. William Callison, Why a Fiduciary Duty Shift to Creditors of Insolvent
Business Entities is Incorrect as a Matter of Theory and Practice, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L.
431, 444–49 (2007).
88. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty,
36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993).
89. Id.
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have preferred if bargaining were cheap and promises fully enforced.90
Fiduciarian legal scholars consider fiduciary duties through a different,
morally-based lens, and begin by contemplating thick state-imposed
restrictions that substantially hamper the freedom to act of a person whose
performance involves the risk of injury to others.91 Fiduciarians accept that
values other than wealth-maximization, including trust values, are served
by the visions of human relationships underlying fiduciary concepts and
that the fiduciary relationship serves functions not addressed by mere
contract.
From either perspective, orthodox Blabs benefit corporations permit
directors and officers to take an enormous number of interests and factors
into account, many of which are unspecified by the shareholders who adopt
the benefit corporation posture. General public benefit is a mish-mash and
directors, all of whom have personal interests and some of whom may have
personal agendas, are simply tossed into the middle of the mess. For
example, if directors conclude that electric car promotion is a social good,
Teslas can be acquired for all corporate executives. If directors think that
polar bear preservation is good, the corporation can spend large fortunes to
maintain ice in Greenland. From the contractarian perspective, further
specification of fiduciary duties by contract is not contemplated and the
gap-fillers are not sufficiently robust. From the fiduciarian perspective,
there are fundamentally no restrictions that hamper the freedom of directors
whose actions involve the risk of injury to others. Benefit corporations
open the door for irresponsible directors to justify their actions (including
self-interested actions) by pointing to some public benefit justification (or
alternatively when public benefit is involved, to some private shareholder
benefit justification). Managerial accountability has proven difficult in
for-profit enterprises,92 and it is difficult to conceptualize accountability in
a hybrid entity with both broad general public purposes and narrow private
purposes.93
90. Id.
91. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Officers and

Directors, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 945–48 (1990); Victor A. Brudney, Contract and
Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 597–98 (1997).
92. It is likely that the shareholder wealth maximization norm has become more
salient because it provides clearer corporate objectives than other alternatives, giving
guidance to directors and allowing sharper judicial focus on directorial actions. See
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in
Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1169, 1173 n.11 (2002) (arguing that by permitting directors to justify their actions by
reference to more “diffuse” concerns than those of shareholders, the judicial job of
judging fiduciary compliance becomes impossible).
93. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Note, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) (“When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate
management and ‘control’ to shareholders is weakened or eliminated, the management
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On the other hand, it is arguable that, despite the rhetoric of public
benefit contained in the orthodox benefit corporation Model, the directors
of a benefit corporation will follow the power—they are elected by
shareholders—and will ultimately serve the private interests of the
shareholders rather than some broad social good. When faced with a
conflict between shareholder interests and social goods, directors will
likely align with the shareholders, since only the shareholders vote for
directors. Thus, the social aspects of benefit corporation legislation may be
illusory whenever they conflict with private interests.94 In addition, it
seems difficult to coordinate benefit corporation status with director
fiduciary obligations to creditors in insolvency settings.95
D. The Greenwash/Greenmail Enforcement Problem
1. Greenwash Possibilities
To the extent a “benefit corporation” election is intended to confer
special branding status in the marketplace, the unregulated nature of the
election, and the possibility of greenwashing for-profit activities under the
benefit corporation label, is a significant problem.96 All that is necessary
and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute.”). Berle was not against a
regime in which corporate managers could consider non-shareholder interests, but
argued that until a sensible system emerges to constrain managers who consider
broader interests, the status quo should remain. Id. (“Unchecked by present legal
balances, a social-economic absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevolent,
might be unsafe; and in any case it hardly affords the soundest base on which to
construct the economic commonwealth which industrialism seems to require.
Meanwhile, as lawyers, we had best be protecting the interests we know, being no less
swift to provide for the new interests as they successively appear.”); see also
Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1445 (arguing that displacing the wealth maximization
norm would create the “very real risk that some corporate directors and officers will
use nonshareholder interests as a cloak for actions to advance their own interests”).
94. See Strine, Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 6, at 150–51 (“Equally
unrealistic is the idea that corporations authorized to consider other interests will be
able to do so at the expense of stockholder profits if voting control of the corporation
remains in the stock market. Just how long will hedge funds and mutual funds
subordinate their desire for returns to a desire of a founder to do good?”). I think the
problem goes beyond publicly held stock to all situations in which directors are elected
by shareholders that they do not control.
95. This uncertainty may impede the ability of benefit corporations to borrow
money or otherwise operate on credit and, at a minimum, should require complex
covenant restrictions on benefit corporations that borrow money. Without such
restrictions, creditors could watch corporate assets disappear into the public realm and
would run the risk of director irresponsibility.
96. Bill Clark and Elizabeth Babson give considerable attention to the market
demand for benefit corporations by consumers and investors. Clark & Babson, supra
note 4, at 819–22 (“For-profit social entrepreneurship, social investing and the
sustainable business movement have reached critical mass and are now at an inflection
point. Accelerating consumer and investor demand has resulted in a substantial
marketplace for companies that are using the power of business to solve social
problems.”).
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for a corporation to be a benefit corporation is for the corporation, at the
formation or through shareholder election, to elect the status and include
two words in its articles of incorporation. A benefit corporation then
assesses its “material positive impact on society and the environment”
against some third-party standard, has a benefit director, and prepares (or
does not, who’s to say) annual benefit reports. Other than potential,
derivative benefit enforcement proceedings, in which standing is limited to
shareholders and directors and in which damages are not a remedy, there is
no enforcement mechanism to ensure that corporations which fail to seek
general public benefit do not latch on to the benefit corporation moniker
and the developing marketplace for social enterprises. In addition, the
benefit corporation legislation contains no naming requirements, keeping
traditional for-profit corporations from calling themselves benefit
corporations, or forcing nonconforming corporations to stop designating
themselves as benefit corporations and obtaining branding benefits.
For example, assume a dog kennel business (dog lovers being a socially
and environmentally conscious breed) wants to distinguish itself from its
competitors and capture greater market share. Its sole shareholder elects
benefit corporation status, amends the articles of incorporation to state that
“Dudley Dooright Kennels” is a benefit corporation, and changes the
corporate name to “Dudley Dooright Kennels Benefit Corporation.” The
corporation now “shall have a purpose of creating general public benefit,”
but unless a specific public benefit purpose is also elected, the articles do
not need to say anything about benefit purpose, only that the corporation is
a benefit corporation. Dudley Dooright, originally the sole director and
still the sole shareholder, elects an “independent” benefit director.
“Independent” is defined in the Blabs Model as a person “having no
material relationship with a benefit corporation,” and states that employees,
immediate family members, and five percent owners are conclusively
presumed not independent.97 Not knowing what an “immediate family
member” is (and not really caring), Dudley appoints his brother as the
independent director and pays him an annual stipend for his services.98
Dudley then advertises and otherwise holds the corporation out as a benefit
corporation and, since dog boarders board dogs and do not investigate
truth-in-marketing, the corporation captures market share and does
exceedingly well. Dudley never gives any consideration to social or
environmental factors when making board decisions, just profit. At year
97. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102.
98. If the brother does not pan out, for example, by being too independent or by

threatening benefit enforcement proceedings, he can be removed and replaced by
Dudley, the sole shareholder.
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end, the corporation is supposed to prepare an annual benefit report, deliver
it to Dudley, and either post it on the public portion of its Internet website
or provide a copy to any person requesting a copy. The Model also
requires that the corporation deliver a copy of the benefit report to the
Secretary of State for filing, but assuming that the state statute maintains
this requirement (and the resulting governmental cost), there is no review
component. If Dudley’s benefit corporation fails to prepare an annual
benefit report, there is no enforcement mechanism. Similarly, Dudley’s
corporation can comply in a pro forma manner with the report requirements
and state certain ways the general public benefit was pursued and the extent
to which it was created, the process and rationale for selecting or changing
the third-party standard, an assessment of performance against the thirdparty standard, and other required matters. The report can be sketchy,
forward-looking, vague, non-analytical or fabricated, and no one will know
the difference.
2. Greenmail
As noted above, benefit corporation shareholders and directors can bring
“benefit enforcement proceedings,” and thereby allege that the benefit
corporation failed to adequately pursue a general public benefit. For
example, if a benefit corporation produces widgets but could theoretically
do so with less social or environmental harm (or with some greater social
or environmental benefit), shareholders and directors can sue for the harm
(or for the failure to benefit). A court, presumably, would determine
whether the directors failed to adequately consider the harm when deciding
to produce widgets in an efficient and cost effective manner. At one level,
this empowers shareholders and directors as eternal nags and reduces the
efficiency of corporate boards (and increases the cost of obtaining board
members), which face litigation whenever some portion of the company is
unhappy with its direction.99 At a higher extreme, it fosters a greenmail
scenario where shareholders can seek to be bought off through higher profit
distributions or through adherence to their idiosyncratic conception of the
good. In any case, the enabling of open-ended shareholder litigation
without focus is an obvious problem of the current Model.
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
A. Forget Corporations and Use Limited Liability Companies
One possible solution to the hybrid entity conundrum is to allow
99. Consideration needs to be given to the availability and extent of director and
officer (“D&O”) insurance in the benefit corporation context.
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corporations to be corporations, with attendant possible shareholder wealth
maximization norms intact, and to encourage “social enterprise entities” to
organize as limited liability companies, which permit contractually tailored
for-profit and nonprofit purposes.100 Although this might simplify choice
of entity decisions and reduce information costs to investors and others
who transact business with business entities, since they would know what
“Inc.” signifies, in my view, this is an insufficient basis for shifting the
focus from benefit corporations to limited liability companies. First, the
fact that some newly formed business enterprises choose the benefit
corporation form indicates that, at least in some cases, there is perceived
tax or business benefit to the corporate form. Second, with respect to
existing corporations, the conversion into limited liability company form
could be costly and difficult.101 Third, because investors and others
undertake (or should undertake) due diligence prior to investment, the
information cost rationale may not withstand scrutiny since it would not be
costly for investors to learn of nonprofit maximizing purposes prior to
investing in a corporation. Such purposes would, in the case of benefit
corporations, be set forth in the articles of incorporation. Finally, a move
to an LLC regime is intellectually unappetizing because it fails to attempt a
resolution of the historical tension over what it means to incorporate—
intractable wealth maximization, default rules, or something else. Thus, in
my view, the fact that LLCs offer a generally acceptable alternative to
benefit corporations does not mean that there should not be benefit
corporations or that we should not attempt to get benefit corporation
legislation right.
In my view, the “illiberalism problem,” the “bipolarity problem,” the
100. For example, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act allows LLCs to
have nonprofit purposes. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-106(a) (2005) (“A limited
liability company may carry on any lawful business, purpose or activity, whether or not
for profit.”). A number of other state LLC statutes contain similar language. Further,
the whole concept and history of LLCs demonstrates that they are predominately
contractual entities, in which statutory and common law provisions and arrangements
can be varied by the members’ operating agreement. See Ann E. Conaway, The Global
Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 780, 802 (2012) (“[P]resently, the Delaware LLC provides
global investors maximum internal efficiency, as well as asset protection at decreased
agency cost, for businesses operating solely within or outside the United States for
socially-driven enterprises . . . [while benefit corporations create unnecessary] legal
nightmare[s].”). One of the arguments against L3Cs has been that a statutory nonprofit
scheme is unnecessary since LLCs already can be contractually structured with
nonprofit purposes in mind. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 14, at 286–88. The
same argument applies to “benefit LLCs” as enacted in Maryland.
101. At a minimum, the change would entail drafting an operating agreement setting
forth numerous provisions that are otherwise presumed by corporate law. Second,
although tax costs of conversion could be alleviated by using an LLC that elects to be
taxed as a corporation and then using a tax-free reorganization, the conversion of a
corporation into an LLC is not without risk of significant tax cost.
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“fiduciary uncabining problem,” and the “greenwash/greenmail
enforcement problem” are obvious drawbacks to the orthodox benefit
corporation legislation. Assuming that corporations, other than single
shareholder corporations that are dictatorial by nature, want to enable
public-good-enhancing activities, in my view, rational shareholders will not
adopt the benefit corporation form, thereby creating greater risk and cost
when choosing to forego personal profit. The equation is wrong. Further,
in my view, this is tragic, since there is presently a focus on legislative
responses to the profit maximization norm and since creation of an
unworkable statute is a wasted opportunity for corporate law reform. In the
next Section, I discuss alternative methods for success.
B. Adopt a Much Simpler, Contract-Based Structure for Benefit
Corporations
Another approach to benefit corporation legislation would be to accept
the primacy of shareholder choice and allow shareholders to specify the
general or specific public benefits they want their corporation to seek.
Thus, the shareholders of my hypothetical, “Peachblossom Orchard,” could
specify that their corporation’s public purpose is to benefit the Delta,
Colorado community, in general or specific fashion. Further, the
shareholders could elect whether they want accoutrements of the orthodox
Model, such as benefit directors and annual public reporting. If they seek a
third-party brand, the third-party may insist on these things, but otherwise
the shareholders’ agreement should govern. Adoption of this flexible
approach would allow public-good-providing corporations the externality
benefits of the “benefit corporation” brand, while avoiding the negative
effects of the orthodox Model. First, since shareholder choice would be
available, the liberalism problem would be avoided. Second, since
narrower purposes than a vague “general public benefit” could be chosen,
there would not be a separation of benefit-providing corporations into
different categories, and the bipolarity problem would be avoided. Third,
since shareholders would be able to establish boundaries, director fiduciary
duties would be fenced within those boundaries and directors would not be
free to choose general public benefits that suit them. Finally, although
enforcement problems may still exist and need to be addressed, their scope
would be significantly reduced.
Benefit corporations arise from
shareholder choice concepts, and expansive shareholder choice may make
them work.
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CONCLUSION
Benefit corporation legislation can be useful for corporations in which
the shareholders want to encourage public good activities beyond
shareholder profit maximization, and such legislation should be embraced.
However, the Model proposed by Blabs and adopted in several states is
fraught with conceptual and practical hazards that likely will sub-optimally
limit the use of benefit corporations to single shareholder corporations and
the ill-advised. Although limited liability companies presently allow most
or all of the desired features of benefit corporations, there seems to be a
significant desire to allow public benefit considerations to play out in
corporate form. Thus, to solve the problems of the orthodox benefit
corporation Model, it is necessary to look to corporate law. Fortunately,
the problems can be readily solved by building flexibility and shareholder
choice into the Model. This would make benefit corporation status
potentially useful for many corporations, rather than the relatively few
corporations that easily fit the orthodox Model. If it is desired that the
shareholder profit-maximization sheets on the existing procrustean bed of
corporate law be turned down, then contractual flexibility should be sought
and new procrustean laws should be avoided.

